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Abstract
This article examines theories of practical and strategic constraints that
collectively explain why so few terrorist groups in history have crossed (or
attempted to cross) the WMD threshold. From this analysis, it becomes
clear that a terrorist group's deliberations about WMD can be influenced
(positively or negatively) by a variety of factors. Our projections of the
future WMD terrorism threat must therefore account for changes in the
kinds of practical and strategic constraints that could lead to an increased
willingness and/or capability of a group to pursue these kinds of weapons.
Further, there are ways in which governments can influence a terrorist
group's decision-making and thus have a direct impact on the future evolution of the WMD terrorism threat.

Introduction
According to dozens of high profile books and reports published in recent
years, we are virtually certain to see a terrorist attack using a weapon of
mass destruction (WMD) at some point in our lifetime.1 Some observers
have argued that the primary objective of terrorist groups is to kill as
many people as they possibly can, and thus we should expect them to pursue and use WMD. However, this line of reasoning is ill-informed; there is
much more to terrorism than simply intent to kill. Meanwhile, others
have suggested that trends among weak states and the globalization of
crime and terrorist networks are combining to yield a higher probability
of WMD terrorism (dubbed "threat convergence" by some).2 Essentially,
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the suggestion is made that increased access to WMD materials will lead
to more WMD terrorist attacks, taking for granted that terrorist groups
intend to acquire and use them.
However, of the hundreds of terrorist groups that have existed over the
past century, only a handful have used (or tried to use) any kind of WMD.
Furthermore, we know of only a small number of terrorist groups in existence today that have publicly declared an interest in acquiring and using
WMD. What accounts for this noticeable contrast between dire predictions of the threat and the historical record on WMD terrorism? Indeed,
why have so few terrorist groups overall shown an interest in WMD? After
a brief historical review of terrorist-related WMD events, this article will
explore two categories of theoretical constraints (practical and strategic)
that collectively help explain why so few terrorist groups have crossed the
WMD threshold. The analysis will then conclude with implications for
further research and policy development.

WMD Terrorist Attacks and Plots:
Historical Examples
As noted above, there are only a small handful of terrorist attacks or plots
to date involving some form of WMD, and most of these are quite familiar
to students and scholars in the terrorism studies field.3 For example:
• In the autumn of 1984, a cult led by the Bhagwan Shri Rajneesh used
Salmonella Typhimurium—a bacterium that normally causes non-fatal
food poisoning—to contaminate several restaurant salad bars in a plot
to influence a local election in Oregon.4
• In 1985, a small survivalist group in the Ozark Mountains of Arkansas
known as the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord acquired
approximately 30 gallons of potassium cyanide, with the intention of
poisoning water supplies in New York, Chicago, and Washington, D.C.5
• In June 1990, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) used chlorine gas in an assault on a Sri Lankan Armed Forces camp at East
Kiran, injuring 60 soldiers.6
• In March 1995, Aum Shinrikyo—a Japanese religious cult—launched
an attack on the Tokyo subway using sarin gas, killing nearly a dozen
people and injuring thousands more.7
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• Later that year, Chechen rebels planted—but did not detonate—a radiological dispersion device (RDD, also known as a "dirty bomb") consisting of dynamite and cesium 137 in a pedestrian park in Moscow.
• In October 2001, an unknown assailant mailed letters in the U.S.
stuffed with weaponized anthrax, killing five and sickening dozens
more.8
• In January 2003, British police raided an apartment in north London
and found recipes and instructions in Arabic for making ricin as well as
other toxins, along with tools which appeared to contain chemical residue, castor beans (the raw ingredient needed to produce ricin), cherry
and apple seeds (which are used in the production of cyanide), and a
CD-ROM containing instructions for making homemade explosives.9
• In January 2004, U.S. military forces discovered seven pounds of cyanide salt during a raid on a Baghdad house that was reportedly connected with al Qaida, and in November of that year they discovered a
"chemical laboratory" in Fallujah containing potassium cyanide, hydrochloric acid, and sulfuric acid among other deadly materials.10
• In April 2004, Jordanian authorities announced that they had broken
up an al Qaida plot to use large quantities of toxic chemicals—including
sulfuric acid, cyanide and insecticides—in attacks against the U.S.
Embassy, the Jordanian prime minister's office, and the headquarters
of Jordanian intelligence.11
• In late 2005, a manual for the production of al-Mubtakkar, a crude
hydrogen cyanide dispersal device, began appearing on numerous alQaida websites and forums, though to date no such device has been discovered by authorities.12
• In November 2006, an alleged al-Qaida operative known as Dhiren
Barot was convicted in the UK of planning to use a radiological weapon
in a series of attacks on both public gathering places and key economic
targets in both Britain and the U.S.13
• And in December 2008, authorities in the small town of Belfast, Maine
discovered a "dirty bomb" plot involving a well-funded right-wing
extremist named James Cummings.14
In sum, while there is an extensive history of terrorist attacks over the
past 50 years, only a fraction of them have involved any kind of chemical,
biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials. Furthermore, as
John Parachini observed, even the rare incidents that involved the use of
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these kinds of weapons hardly threatened mass destruction.15 Scholars of
terrorism and security studies have offered various reasons for the relative scarcity of WMD terrorist attacks, which generally fall within one of
two categories: practical constraint theories, and strategic constraint theories. Each of these categories has its merits; however, as described later
in this essay, viewing them collectively enlightens our understanding as to
why so few terrorist groups have ventured down the WMD path.

Practical Constraint Theories
The first category of theories basically argues that a terrorist group's
capabilities are significantly constrained by a number of factors, and these
constraints impact their views and decisions about CBRN weapons. There
are generally two kinds of practical considerations: technical and
environmental.

Technical Constraints
Theories of technical constraints are drawn from the complex nature of
the weapons; essentially, CBRN weapons are complicated and difficult to
build, transport, and successfully deploy against a specified target. These
complications, in turn, diminish the terrorist group's likelihood of successfully carrying out their attack. In other words, as Figure 1 illustrates,
more complicated terrorist plots have lower chances of success, and this
influences a terrorist group's choices about the type of weapons they
would use in their attacks. Furthermore, increased technological complexity of a weapon usually increases its financial costs, another key consideration for terrorist groups.
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Figure 1: Constraints of Technical Complexity

Source: Author

When a terrorist group devotes its time, money and resources toward an
attack, they will naturally want to maximize the likelihood of their operation's success. However, terrorist groups are limited by what their members are capable of accomplishing. For instance, most terrorist groups
have encountered significant difficulty attracting competent bio-chemists,
physicists, radiological technicians or nuclear engineers capable of developing these types of weapons. Properly handling and storing hazardous
chemicals, biological pathogens, or radioactive materials is also dangerous and requires sophisticated knowledge and skill. At the most extreme
end of the CBRN spectrum, there are no current terrorist groups with the
kind of advanced technical expertise needed to build and deploy a nuclear
weapon. As noted below, it is instructive that the historical record contains only one group (Aum Shinrikyo) that had the means, capabilities,
intentions and finances to develop and deploy a sophisticated weapon of
mass destruction. And even for them, a nuclear weapon was far beyond
their reach.
If an extremist group does manage to overcome the significant technical
challenges attributed to building a viable CBRN weapon, the group may
still be unable to test the weapon in order to determine its effectiveness.
Again, this raises a level of uncertainty into operational planners concerned with minimizing the possibility that their attack will fail. In a
sense, terrorist groups are somewhat risk-averse; their fear of failure can
be a constraining factor in their decision-making. Another factor constraining these groups involves the various challenges of delivering a
55
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CBRN weapon to its target safely and effectively. For example, many of
these types of weapons are relatively fragile and can expose the group's
members to enormous risks when transporting the device. Overall, there
are many kinds of technical challenges associated with CBRN weapons.
These challenges, in turn, influence a terrorist group's decision-making
about whether to invest resources in trying to develop or acquire them for
use.

Environmental Constraints
Other kinds of practical considerations are a product of the terrorist
group's operating environment. From this aspect, theorists argue that a
WMD attack is difficult as there are limited numbers of sources for CBRN
weapons. Those who possess them, more importantly, are reluctant to
share them with anyone else, let alone terrorists. Furthermore, the materials and technology necessary to develop CBRN weapons are difficult to
acquire, and often prohibitively expensive. Interestingly, the financial
aspects are sometimes overlooked by analysts, but apart from some
industrial chemicals that are relatively ubiquitous and cheap, procuring
the materials needed for most kinds of WMD can be expensive.
CBRN materials and technologies are also difficult to steal or purchase, as
the international community over the past two decades has placed an
emphasis on monitoring and restricting the commercial sale and transportation of these materials and technologies, particularly across borders.
For instance, new sensor technologies have decreased a group's ability to
transport CBRN materials (and weapons) from one location to another,
particularly across borders. Furthermore, if a WMD terror attack
occurred somewhere in the world tomorrow, it is highly likely that the
international community would respond with even greater restrictions on
access and movement of these types of materials and technologies. Conversely, a foreign terrorist group may attempt to acquire CBRN materials
within their target country, in order to assemble the weapon within that
country and avoid the border control challenges. However, this approach
would bring a number of different logistical and tactical challenges
related to operating in an unfamiliar environment, again raising levels of
uncertainty about the potential success of an attack plan.
Local conditions within a particular country are particularly important in
regards to a terrorist group's access to CBRN materials and technologies
required for a WMD effort. For example, Aum Shinrikyo—the only group
known to have developed its own advanced chemical weapons program—
was allowed by Japanese government and society to hide behind a shroud
of religious protections and a seemingly legitimate industrial chemical
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business. Key lessons from that attack have been learned, and thus we are
unlikely to ever see that combination of extremist ideologies and technical
capabilities again.
Of course, the severity of these practical constraints—both technical and
environmental—differs according to the specific type of CBRN weapon.
For instance, the odds would be more favorable for a terrorist group
somewhere to acquire or develop at least a rudimentary chemical weapon
using commonly available industrial chemicals like phosgene, chlorine,
hydrogen cyanide, or concentrated pesticides. Even some ordinary household chemicals could feasibly be used to construct low-grade but effective
chemical weapons.
From this perspective, it is worrisome that within the past few decades we
have seen a global proliferation of private firms developing and profiting
from various kinds of CBRN materials and technologies. Still, as noted
earlier, there have been only a handful of terrorist incidents involving
CBRN weapons of any kind over the past half century. In other words,
even the increasing availability of potential WMD components—
essentially, reducing the practical constraints—has not contributed
meaningfully toward a rise in WMD terrorist attacks or plots. Thus, other
types of constraints must also be influencing a terrorist group's
deliberations about these kinds of weapons.

Strategic Constraint Theories
The second category of constraint theories argues that terrorist groups are
largely strategic and rational, and therefore their deliberations about
CBRN weapons involve various strategic calculations, like cost benefit
analyses. For example, a terrorist group's leaders may ask themselves,
"Will a CBRN weapon help us achieve our objectives faster or more
effectively than other means? Will the possession or use of such a weapon
bring us a considerable amount of prestige and/or power to intimidate
our enemies?" For most terrorist groups, their strategic deliberations
have steered them away from CBRN weapons. In fact, many scholars have
observed that there are very few strategic benefits a terrorist group could
derive from using a CBRN weapon, particularly compared to other, more
conventional kinds of weapons. Furthermore, even if a group believes
there may be some strategic benefit from a CBRN weapon, the practical
constraint theories described earlier would still weigh heavily on their
decision whether to actually pursue developing or acquiring such
weapons.
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The terrorist group would additionally need to consider whether a WMD
attack would be counterproductive by generating, for example, condemnation among the group's potential supporters. This possible erosion in
support, in turn, would degrade the group's political legitimacy among its
constituencies, who are viewed as critical to the group's long-term survival. By crossing this WMD threshold, the group could feasibly undermine its popular support, encouraging a perception of the group as
deranged mass murders, rather than righteous vanguards of a movement
or warriors fighting for a legitimate cause.16 The importance of perception
and popular support—or at least tolerance—gives a group reason to think
twice before crossing the threshold of catastrophic terrorism. A negative
perception can impact a broad range of critical necessities, including
finances, safe haven, transportation logistics, and recruitment. Many terrorist groups throughout history have had to learn this lesson the hard
way; the terrorist groups we worry about most today have learned from
the failures and mistakes of the past, and take these into consideration in
their strategic deliberations.
Furthermore, a WMD attack could prove counterproductive by provoking
a government (or possibly multiple governments) to significantly expand
their efforts to destroy the terrorist group. Following a WMD attack in a
democracy, there would surely be a great deal of domestic pressure on
elected leaders to respond quickly and with a massive show of force. A
recognition of his reality is surely a constraining factor on Hezbollah
deliberations about attacking Israel, or the Chechen's deliberations about
attacking Russia, with such a weapon.
A group's strategic thinking about WMD is also shaped by the nature of its
ideology. For example, the Marxist ideology of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) or the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in
Peru articulates a future in which they will someday be in charge of a particular governable space. This strategic vision requires them to overthrow
an existing government while ensuring that the space and people they
seek to influence and govern are left relatively undamaged. From this perspective, many types of CBRN weapons would not be useful in achieving
this political objective. In contrast, ideologies that articulate a clear dividing line between "us" and "them" allow members of a terrorist group and
its supporters to view all of "them" (or the "others") as legitimate targets.17 This, in turn, may expand the range of weapons the group considers useful.
Victor Asal and Karl Rethemeyer highlight this point in their research on
terrorist group lethality, using the term "othering" to describe a "process
of clearly articulating groups and individuals that have a lesser moral or
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ethical status than members of the terrorist organization and the racial,
ethnic, geographic, or language group they purport to represent."18 They
find this "othering" to be most pronounced among religious groups. In
fact, Bruce Hoffman notes that religion "functions as a legitimizing force,
specifically sanctioning wide-scale violence against an almost open-ended
category of opponents."19 From this perspective, it is noteworthy that two
of the groups that crossed the WMD threshold were religious cults (Aum
Shinrikyo and the Rajneeshes), as each seemed unconstrained by earthly
considerations. In truth, however, their uses of CBRN weapons were for
very local, practical objectives, rather than in the service of a higher
power. While the Rajneeshes were attempting to influence a local election, the attack by Aum Shinrikyo against the Tokyo subway was intended
to distract authorities and delay an ongoing investigation into activities of
the group's leader Shoko Asahara.
Asal and Rethemeyer also found that in addition to religious groups,
ethno-nationalists have a strong "othering" component in their
ideologies, noting that groups in this category "can be just as
indiscriminately violent as organizations motivated by religious fervor."20
This raises the question whether ethno-nationalists may have a stronger
inclination for CBRN weapons than other groups. Indeed, as noted
earlier, at least two groups implicated in WMD attacks or plots in recent
years were ethno-nationalist in ideological orientation. If the perceived
enemies of a terrorist group (like Sinhalese or Russians) are separated by
physical geography from the aggrieved population represented by the
terrorist group (like Tamils or Chechens), perhaps there are fewer
strategic constraints when considering a catastrophic terror attack against
the governing regime (in Sri Lanka or Russia) and those who support it.
This line of reasoning suggests that Chechens may someday consider
deploying a CBRN weapon against Moscow or some other densely
populated city in Russia, if they felt that doing so would force the
government to acquiesce to Chechen demands for an independent
homeland. However, as noted earlier, it is also likely that any attack of
this type would result in a massive use of force against Chechens, thus a
WMD attack would prove counterproductive.
From an analytical perspective, a key question is whether "othering" provides a uniquely salient justification for certain groups—like religious and
ethno-national—to have more interest in CBRN weapons. In theory, this
dimension of "othering" might also help explain the motivations behind
James Cummings' ill-fated attempt to build a dirty bomb and detonate it
in Washington, D.C.21 In this case, Cummings' hatred of an "other" ethnicity, fueled by racial insecurities, compelled him to pursue a CBRN
weapon, although it is clear that using high explosives could have
59
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achieved the same intended results. Overall, however, we have not seen
enough of a significant prevalence of WMD interests among religious,
ethno-nationalist or any category of terrorist group to indicate a significant link between "othering" and decision-making with regard to WMD.
Finally, as with the practical constraint theories, the application of strategic constraint theories to our threat analyses must differ according to the
attributes of each specific type of weapon. For instance, some weapons—
like a small-scale chemical or radiological bomb—would be dramatic but
would likely yield few casualties and would impact a relatively small, contained geographic area. In contrast, a contagious pathogen used in a bioterror attack could lead to a wide variety of scenarios, some of which
include massive casualties and a potentially regional or even global
impact. The political ideologies of most terrorist groups would suggest
that the former, rather than the latter, is a more likely kind of CBRN
weapon to anticipate at some point in our future. Meanwhile, some
observers have suggested that the most devastating kinds of WMD attack
would likely be carried out by an apocalyptic cult, whose strategic objectives require the death of as many people as possible. Overall, the important point to make here is that we should not consider strategic
constraints to be universal across the entire CBRN spectrum.
In summary, the collection of strategic constraint theories indicates that a
terrorist group is more likely to believe that its goals and objectives can be
achieved through the use of conventional explosives and other kinds of
non-WMD attacks—the perceived 'value added' of a WMD is viewed as
just not worth the investment of time, effort, or risks. From this perspective, it stands to reason that governments can influence a terrorist group's
strategic deliberations about CBRN weapons in ways that can enhance
global security, as described below.

Implications for Research and Policy on
WMD Terrorism
The application of the theories described above requires a case-by-case
analysis of each terrorist group. For some groups, the strategic constraints for CBRN weapons are low—this includes al-Qaida, which has
publicly declared an interest in acquiring and using CBRN weapons.
However, the available information indicates that practical constraints
remain a significant obstacle to overcome for virtually all terrorist groups.
Some groups may have significant technical and global capabilities, but
thus far have not expressed an interest in CBRN weapons, suggesting that
perhaps strategic constraints have kept them from crossing the WMD
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threshold. Analyzing these together reveals a collection of logical reasons
for why most terrorist groups have not crossed the WMD threshold. Furthermore, when looking at the available information and attributes of the
terrorist groups that are of most concern to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—many of which are on the U.S. Department of State's
list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations—we find that a majority of groups
are clustered in the "high practical constraints/high strategic constraints"
quadrant of Figure 2. Accordingly, there are very few groups in either the
"low practical constraints" (e.g., a well-funded and equipped group like
Hizballah) or "low strategic constraints" (e.g., apocalyptic cults). The
most concerning kinds of groups, in terms of WMD threat analysis, are
those that we would place in the "low strategic constraints/low practical
constraints" quadrant. Fortunately, as noted earlier, available information suggests there are no current terrorist groups with comparatively low
practical and strategic constraints with regard to WMD.
Figure 2: A combination of factors influence a group's decisionmaking, and places most terrorist groups in the High Strategic
Constraints/High Practical Constraints category

Source: Author
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Of course, Figure 2 reflects only a brief snapshot based on current information about those terrorist groups, while proper threat analysis must
take into account a temporal dimension as well, as national security
threats change and evolve over time. Thus, to deepen our understanding
of how to project the future WMD terrorist threat, there are a variety of
questions to consider for both research and policy. For example, how and
why could these constraining factors diminish for a particular group? In
other words, under what conditions might a group change from the
upper-right quadrant to the lower-left quadrant (see Figure 3), indicating
an increased likelihood of that group pursuing and using a CBRN
weapon? In essence, a reduction in practical and/or strategic constraints
is assumed to have some kind of impact on a group's deliberations about
WMD.
Figure 3: Hypothetically, diminished Practical and/or Strategic Constraints could lead to an increased WMD threat from a particular terrorist group

Source: Author
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Some things that might impact practical constraints include regular
scientific breakthroughs, potentially reducing the technological
challenges of CBRN weapons. Are we making WMD easier to develop?
Similarly, what is the impact of the global increase in biotechnology labs,
or in the industrial uses of radioisotopes and new kinds of chemicals? Are
we making potential WMD materials easier to acquire? A constant worry
is that a terrorist group with a resonating ideology could succeed in
recruiting sophisticated experts in biotechnology, chemistry, or other
sciences—similar to Aum Shinrikyo's actions during the 1990s. Guarding
against radicalization among members of the scientific community should
be a critical dimension of any counterterrorism strategy. Also, as noted
earlier in this discussion, the intersecting relationships of global criminal
networks and terrorism could lead to a more facilitating environment for
a WMD terrorist attack.
Over the past decade, the international community has focused considerable resources on exacerbating practical constraints, making it harder for
terrorist groups to acquire CBRN materials and technologies. Combating
the proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies—through intelligence, interdiction and international cooperation—has been a particularly
prominent goal of the Obama administration's foreign policy agenda. As
Graham Allison has poignantly observed, the premise of these efforts is
that if there are no nuclear materials, there can be no nuclear terrorism.22
Of course, as noted earlier, there are rudimentary low-impact chemical
weapons that can be fashioned out of ordinary household items, however,
much has been done to constrain access to the kind of big-impact CBRN
weapons featured in the more prominent public debates and Hollywood
movies.
An underlying question at this point is, would decreased barriers to
acquire or build a CBRN weapons lead to stronger interest or increased
efforts to do so? In other words, if CBRN weapons (or materials to make
them) were easier to make or obtain, would more groups have and use
them? Or would strategic constraints supersede here, meaning that the
group would still not pursue WMD even if these weapons became easier
to acquire or develop, because of limited perceived benefit, and potential
counterproductive impact? Perhaps most importantly, why (and in what
ways) might we see a group change its views toward CBRN weapons in the
future?
Projecting the impact of changes in strategic constraints is obviously
more complicated. There are many foreseeable events or situations in
which a terrorist group may feel less constrained by the strategic and
ideological considerations described above. For instance, if a terrorist
63
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group's primary state sponsor were the target of a WMD attack, would
that terrorist group then use WMD in a retribution-style attack?
Similarly, if a government used CBRN weapons against a group (or its
constituents), would the targeted group feel compelled to respond in kind,
regardless of the costs? In other words, if Iran were to use chemical
munitions against the People's Mujahedin of Iran (MeK) or Jundullah, or
Syria deployed chemical weapons against rebels (like Saddam Hussein's
attacks against Kurdish villages during the 1980s), would it mobilize
thousands of sympathizers to embrace terrorism, including some who
commit themselves to acquiring and using WMD against Syrian
government forces or civilian targets? Would a group turn to a CBRN
weapon in an act of desperation or last resort? For example, would a sense
of growing irrelevance and a need to recapture center stage (or risk losing
influence forever) drive a member or affiliate group of al-Qaida to cross
the WMD threshold?
These and other questions address an important—and often underappreciated—issue about changes in the strategic calculations a group
would make about WMD terrorism. Under what conditions could CBRN
weapons become widely supported by a group's constituencies? If a
government comes to power in a democracy but is seen as weak, could
this offer a new strategic benefit to a terrorist group that demonstrates a
capability to deploy CBRN weapons, threatens to use such weapons, and
then forces a negotiated settlement to whatever conflict animates their
violence? What about peer pressure—if a group (particularly one
considered a peer competitor) crosses the WMD threshold, would it
incentivize others to follow (an adaptation of Mia Bloom's "outbidding"
thesis with regard to suicide bombings)?23 One group's ability to develop
and use CBRN weapons may not change the inherent nature of WMD
terrorism—particularly the risks, financing and level of technical
sophistication necessary—but this could forge a path that other groups
would eventually follow.
While research is still needed on the ways in which situations and events
could elevate the threat of WMD terrorism, we must also focus our efforts
on understanding what the international community can do to exacerbate
the practical and strategic constraints in ways that can lower the chances
of a WMD terror attack in the future. Hence, are we making the environment harder for the terrorists now than it has been before? Beyond the
realm of practical constraints, are we influencing the strategic deliberations of terrorist groups and can we do so more effectively? For example,
surely Hezbollah's leaders know without a doubt that openly declaring an
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interest in CBRN weapons, or even the mere possession of precursor
materials for such weapons, would likely bring considerable negative
attention from neighboring countries in the Middle East, especially Israel.
One assumption that is made in this policy arena is that a posture of certain and forceful retaliation can be a way of convincing a group that a
WMD would most definitely not be in their best self-interests. For example, as noted earlier, Chechen groups may be constrained from using
CBRN weapons in attacks against Moscow because of the likelihood that
such attacks would produce heavy-handed Russian military reprisals.
When studying the history of terrorism, we find that groups and their
leaders have been influenced by a core instinct for survival; there are very
few instances where a terrorist group intentionally set out to do something knowing that their success in the operation would lead directly to
their own demise. Furthermore, the more established the terrorist group
is, and the more entrenched its leaders are, the more the group has to
lose. This aspect, in turn, also influences caution in their strategic deliberations about the usefulness of CBRN weapons.
One obvious comparison here is in the case of the 9/11 attacks in New
York and Washington, D.C. While CBRN weapons were not involved, the
effects of those attacks are considered by many to be equal in scale of
death and destruction to what we envision from a WMD terrorist attack. A
significant body of research has emerged since those attacks, which suggests that the leaders of al-Qaida made several strategic miscalculations.
For example, Max Abrahms and Karolina Lula offer compelling empirical
and theoretical evidence that Usama bin Ladin "overestimated the likelihood that 9/11 would coerce American concessions."24 Instead, the terrorist network lost its safe haven in Afghanistan, its Taliban allies were
driven from power, and many senior leaders of both al-Qaida and the Taliban have been killed or captured. One could easily make the argument
that the situation and future prognosis for both al-Qaida and the Taliban
would be much different had the 9/11 attacks not occurred. This should
prove instructive for terrorist groups considering whether a CBRN attack
would be of sufficient strategic benefit.
Finally, governments must be prudent and responsible with regard to preparing their citizens to deal effectively with a WMD terrorist attack. If
such an attack produces mass panic, draconian security measures or other
forms of over-reaction from the government, this could support the ideological narrative of the terrorist group, thus incentivizing future WMD
terrorist attacks. If we accept the premise that there are some things that
could increase the WMD terror threat in the future, what are we doing
now to prepare an appropriate response?
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In summary, there are many research questions that can enhance our
analysis of the future WMD threat. The underlying focus of this research
should be to gain a clear understanding of what could increase (or diminish) the practical and/or strategic constraints that terrorist groups face
regarding CBRN weapons. That understanding, in turn, should guide policies and strategies for combating the threat of WMD terrorism. By combining theories and empirical evidence, we can provide a more accurate
portrayal of this threat and how to respond most effectively.

Conclusion
This analysis indicates there is a need for new research that incorporates
empirical evidence and new theories on how events and contextual situations can impact a terrorist group's deliberations about WMD. For example, what data or evidence is available that can tell us how one WMD
attack might impact the strategic calculations and deliberations of other
groups in the future? Hence, projecting the future WMD threat must consider whether the theories of practical and strategic constraints described
here will hold constant or change according to events and situational conditions. Only then can we find an appropriate balance between underestimating the threat and promoting mass hysteria. Meanwhile, the objective
of governments, and the international community in general, should be to
increase all kinds of constraints, eventually making the practical and strategic challenges insurmountable for any terrorist group to cross the WMD
threshold in the future.
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